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RÉFÉRENCE
James HARRIS, ed., The Anatomy of Terror, Political Violence Under Stalin, Oxford :
Oxford University Press, 2013, 352 p.
1 In  2013,  Oxford  University  Press  published  a  collection  of  articles  about  Stalinist
repression, edited by James Harris, and based on a conference at Leeds University in
2010.12 This new collection of articles about the Stalinist Terror of the 1930s reminds us
that this topic is still worth examining, despite the fact that it has been actively studied
for many years. Several significant international research projects on the topic have
been successfully  realized.3 New archival  documents about the terror are published
constantly.  Given these circumstances,  it  is  important  to  consider  the intermediate
conclusions  of  this  new work,  to  reflect  on  its  directions,  intellectual  debates,  and
possible approaches to analysis that recent research brings to light. 
2 The  Anatomy  of  Terror partially  achieves  the  objective  laid  out  by  the  editor,  James
Harris, of “synchronizing the watches.” At the same time, this book demonstrates some
disturbing and continuing tendencies in research about the events of 1937 and 1938. In
this article, I propose to examine these two aspects—where this collection fits within
the current state of the literature, but especially some of more objectionable arguments
put forward by some of the contributors.
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Figures and Historical Context
3 The  historiography  of  the  Stalinist  repression  of  the  1930s  has  covered  significant
ground.  Contemporary  research  based  on  an  examination  of  Soviet  archives  has
replaced the  spectacular  image of  the  “Great  Terror”  suggested by  the  late  Robert
Conquest. In the early 1990s, with the opening of Soviet era archives, the first task was
to determine exactly how many victims of the terror there were. Archived statistics
from  the  Soviet  punitive  system  revealed  that  during  Iosif  Stalin’s  leadership,  the
repressive  organs  did  not  swallow  a  figure  in  the  high  tens  of  millions,  as  was
previously thought, but “only” a few dozen million people. Among those, victims of
political repression comprised only one group. Given this, everyone agreed that the
information that existed in the archives needed to be examined and elucidated. 
4 Stephen Wheatcroft’s chapter included in the volume under consideration is devoted to
such an elucidation.  Wheatcroft  compares  the  most  significant  sources  of  statistics
about the repression, and concludes that, on the whole, they do not contradict each
other.  Melanie  Ilic’s  article  “The  Great  Terror  in  Leningrad:  Evidence  from  the
Leningradskii martirolog” reveals an important new tendency. More and more, historians
not only work on calculating the number of victims of the terror; they also study their
socio‑demographic  characteristics.  Numerous  regional  martyrologies (knigi  pamiati) ,
based on the accounts of witnesses, as well as the historical records themselves, make
this process possible.4 
5 Wheatcroft and Ilic’s articles remind us that the task of researching the statistics of the
repression,  initiated  many  years  ago,  is  far  from  complete.  Yet  the  process  has
apparently come to a halt.  Having gained access to the archives in the early 1990s,
historians have engaged only in the most basic activities, such as citing pre‑prepared
data  compiled  by  the  Records  Departments  of  the  NKVD‑MVD and the  Ministry  of
Justice  of  the  USSR.  Despite  the  significance  of  these  sources,  though,  ministerial
statistics do not account for all acts of repression.5 An outstanding task is to determine
and systematize precise information about those shot, arrested, sent to labor camps,
and so on, during the entire Stalin period, including the war years. Progress has been
made only in a few of these areas, the most significant of which is the mass operation of
1937‑1938. As additional examinations of the statistics of the state security organs have
shown, from October 1936 to November 1938, 1.7 million people were arrested in the
USSR,  and  of  them  1.5  million  were  convicted,  including  the  740,000  who  were
sentenced  to  death.  These  figures  are  not  definitive;  however,  they  do  exceed  the
official numbers by about 8.5 percent.6
6 This  evidence  of  the  incredible  force  and  cruelty  of  state  terror  explains  the
unrelenting interest  in the events  of  1937‑1938.  It  is  obvious that  the Great  Terror
reflects the essence of the Stalinist system and of Stalin himself. At the same time, the
phenomenon of  terror in the USSR cannot be fully understood outside the broader
historical context. The authors of some of the chapters included in the volume remind
us of this. David L. Hoffman examines the phenomena of European and Russian state
violence in the twentieth century. He devotes particular attention to such practices as
“social categorization” and “social excision.” There is no doubt that during the Stalin
period such practices underwent a rapid and extensive transformation. Additionally,
Hoffman once again raises  an important  methodological  issue.  He writes  about  the
correlation between the  broad,  historical  preconditions  for  a  phenomenon and the
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concrete reasons for and forms in which a particular phenomenon becomes reality at a
given moment. Hoffman notes, “I do not argue that techniques of social categorization
and social excision in themselves caused Soviet state violence.” In their own articles,
David Priestland and J. Arch Getty continue to develop this argument regarding the
division  between  the  general  context  and  the  direct  preconditions  for  the
phenomenon.
7 Thus, there exists a general understanding that it is important to separate the broader
explanatory conceptions of Stalinist terror from the concrete conditions and reasons
that  led  to  particular  acts  of  violence  during  particular  years.  With  respect  to  the
concrete reasons and essence of the phenomenon of 1937‑1938, a particular dispute has
persisted in the literature, which the volume under consideration clearly attests. On
the one side, there are a group of historians that I will provisionally refer to from here
as “traditionalists.”7 On the other side, there are historians who for decades have been
developing the concepts of “weak dictatorship” and spontaneous terror. I will equally
provisionally refer to this second group (in keeping with the emerging tradition) as
“revisionists.”
 
The Logic of Terror
8 The core of the “traditionalist” approach is to treat the terror of the 1930s as a general
concept that was the result of a series of concrete repressive actions. These actions
were carried out according to orders from the center, in which Stalin played a leading
role. The consecutive waves of terror that took place during 1937‑1938 were the result
of the realization of several “mass operations.” The duration and objectives of these
“mass operations” were determined by the country’s highest leadership, and above all,
by Stalin. Based on their reading of new archival documents, the majority of historians
who study Stalinist terror adhere to this perspective. David Shearer and Paul Hagenloh,
two authors whose scholarship on state terror in Stalin’s USSR is well known, write
about this once again in the volume under consideration.8 The “traditional” perspective
is in general supported by the authors of the other chapters in the book.
9 At the same time, this collection, The Anatomy of Terror,  can be viewed as the latest
particular manifestation of “revisionism,” and we may draw several conclusions from it
about the development of revisionist thinking. Gábor Rittersporn, who has long been a
supporter of “revisionism,”9 dedicates a significant portion of his chapter about the
institutional clashes between the Prosecutor’s Office and the NKVD to analyzing the
absence of a clear and solid plan for the “mass operations” of 1937‑1938. J. Arch Getty
develops his earlier concept of “weak dictatorship,” which operated under pressure
from  the  powerful  nomenklatura.  Wendy Goldman and  William  Chase  continue  the
search for a framework to undergird the concept of “initiatives from below,” which
they consider an important factor in the escalation of the terror.  The editor of the
book, James Harris, also effectively demonstrates his tendencies toward “revisionism.”
10 Having explained the relevance of “revisionism,” Harris writes, “We still do not have an
encompassing  explanation  of  the  opening  phase  of  the  Great  Terror  and  of  its
evolution”(8).  However, this  statement  hardly  corresponds  to  reality.  Thanks  to
enormous collections of new documents and the activity of historians over the past
twenty years, we have a thorough understanding of the Great Terror, of its origins, its
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mechanisms,  and  the  results  of  its  “mass  operations.”  The  voluminous  literature
contains detailed and convincing explanations for the terror of 1937‑1938.10 
11 Several general theses from the latest historiography allow us to comprehend the logic
of  the  evolution  of  Stalinist  terror,  and  they  deserve  special  mention.  First,  under
Stalin, violence and state terror ultimately transformed into the foundational methods
for solving all social‑economic questions and for maintaining political stability. This
factor determined the enormous scale of the repressions. Second, the cycles of ruthless
and relatively  weak repression matched the general  oscillations  of  Stalin’s  political
course.  The  flurry  of  terror  in  the  beginning  of  the  1930s  was  related  to  the
implementation of collectivization, and then afterwards to the crisis and starvation of
1932 and 1933. The application of economic incentives for growth, and an orientation
toward  an  alliance  with  Western  democracies  in  the  face  of  the  threat  of  Nazism
resulted in several moments of de‑escalation in the terror within the USSR from 1934 to
1935, despite the murder of Sergei Kirov. Third, changes in the scale of terror were
regulated by directives from the country’s leadership. The “mass operations,” the plans
for which were formulated in Moscow, played a critical role. If the “mass operations”
had  not  been  carried  out,  then  the  level  of  arrests  would  have  fallen.  Fourth,  the
primary focus of the terror,  regardless of  its  intensity,  was directed at members of
social strata who actively resisted Stalinist politics or who were considered potential
threats  to  the  regime.  Their  ranks  included  the  so‑called  “kulaks,”  peasants  who
resisted  collectivization.  Persistent  targets  of  repression  included:  the
pre‑revolutionary privileged classes;  those who had served in the White Army;  and
members  of  groups  who had  rivaled  the  Bolshevik  Party  (Socialist  Revolutionaries,
Mensheviks, etc.). Over time, the most prominent “risk groups” came to include the Old
Bolsheviks, those who had formed various oppositions, as well as rank‑and‑file party
members who at different times had voiced “qualms” or criticized Stalin and his course
of action. For much of the 1930s, criminal offenders, especially repeat offenders who
had been convicted several times, were considered apolitical but still “socially‑harmful
elements.”
12 State security organs made numerous and specific lists of these “dangerous” categories
of the population.11 Many people who found themselves in these files were subjected to
operational surveillance. Periodically, information from the files was used as the basis
for fairly limited repression. However, during the second half of 1936 and 1937, the
country’s political leadership became more firmly convinced of the need either for the
complete physical destruction of “anti‑Soviet elements” or for their isolation in camps.
This idea cannot be called new if we recall, for example, the Stalinist slogan calling for
the destruction of the “kulaks” “as a class,” which was first advanced in 1929 and then
realized throughout the early 1930s.
13 From the second half  of  1936,  the campaign for the destruction of “enemies” “as a
class”  descended  upon  former  oppositionists  and  nomenklatura  personnel.  Many
within the Soviet leadership were either former oppositionists or had worked with and
even  befriended  oppositionists.  It  was  Stalin  who  formulated  the  ideological
foundations for the destruction of former oppositionists as committed opponents who
had turned into “terrorists” and “agents of foreign states.” Under his leadership, the
necessary party resolutions were prepared in the middle of 1936. Likewise, the script
for  the  first  Moscow  show  trial  was  prepared  in  August  1936,  as  well  as  the  key
directives  that  would  initiate  purges  at  the  Central  Committee  plenum  of
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February‑March 1937. At the same time, the party apparatus and the organs of state
security actively worked through the archives and personal files of all the upper‑level
oppositionists.12
14 Having begun primarily as a complete purge of the nomenklatura, the mass repressions
gradually expanded to encompass broader sections of the population. Finally, in July
1937,  a  directive  was  issued  to  destroy  “as  a  class”  all  “anti‑Soviet  elements”  and
potential “enemies.” Stalin sanctioned several “mass operations,” the scale of which
greatly  exceeded  that  of  analogous  operations  in  previous  years.  The  terror  had
become “Great.” 
15 In general,  the documents we have today allow us to trace the specific logic of the
evolution of the idea of a complete purge of the country and the definitive destruction
of  “enemies”  “as  a  class.”  From  the  second  half  of  1936,  this  purge  gained  great
strength and evolved into a universal campaign, which was directed against all possible
“enemies”  and  “suspicious  elements.”  The  question  remains  as  to  what  political
mechanisms and motives drove this all‑encompassing purge. It is exactly this question
that is the source of dispute, including the dispute that can be characterized primarily
as a dispute between “traditionalists” and “revisionists.”
 
Issuing Directives: Stalin and the Secretaries
16 The  logic  and  evolution  of  terror  reached  its  peak  in  July  1937.  In  that  month,  a
directive  was  issued  regarding  the  conduct  of  a  mass  operation  against  so‑called
“anti‑Soviet  elements”  based  on  NKVD  order  No. 00447.  Its  general  purpose  was
obvious. Within the span of a few months, the bulk of the “enemies” and “suspicious
elements”  should  be  definitively  destroyed or  isolated in  camps.  It  is  important  to
underscore that this operation was originally planned based on the existing files of the
NKVD. Arrests  and executions were carried out,  above all,  against  former “kulaks.”
Others  including  “anti‑Soviet  elements,”  “White  Guards,”  Socialist  Revolutionaries,
Mensheviks, and criminal offenders were also repressed.
17 The preparation and issuance of the order was carried out according to a typical Soviet
bureaucratic  scheme.  Initially,  the  primary  directive  about  the  execution  of  the
operation  was  passed  in  Moscow.  In  the  beginning  of  July  1937,  the  regions  were
informed of these plans in the name of the Politburo. The order was given to guarantee
that a specific number of arrests and executions would be carried out according to the
information contained in NKVD materials. Afterwards these “limits” were reviewed and
corrected in Moscow. On the basis of these plans, the central apparatus of the NKVD
prepared  order  No. 00447.  Finally,  on  31 July 1937,  this  order  was  approved  by  the
Politburo and put into force. Originally, the operation stipulated the arrest of around
270,000 people, of whom 76,000 were subject to execution while the rest were to be sent
to forced labor camps. Every region received its own plan for arrests and executions.
The order stipulated also that these could be expanded with the consent of Moscow.
From here on out, the directives regarding the continuation of order No. 00447 were
issued  by  the  center.  At  the  same  time,  operations  were  initiated  against  people
associated with so‑called “counter‑revolutionary national contingents”—Soviet Poles,
Germans, Latvians, and many others.13 In general, all of the available documents attest
to  Stalin’s  leading role  in  the  initiation of  the  mass  operations.  In  their  work,  the
majority of historians have proceeded according to this information. 
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18 Unequivocal  evidence  about  the  centralized  character  of  the  “mass  operations”  of
1937‑1938 and the particular role of the “strong dictator” should have struck a blow to
the  “revisionist”  conception  of  spontaneous  terror,  and  the  implication  of  a  weak
Stalin.  Still,  several  “revisionists”  have  attempted  to  cling  to  their  older  positions,
while  ignoring obvious facts.14 However,  these attempts have ultimately  discredited
“revisionism,” exceeding as they do the boundaries of the rational. Two chapters in
particular in the volume at hand exemplify this tendentiousness. Examination of these
chapters, by J. Arch Getty, allows us to judge the current status of revisionist theory.
19 Getty’s argument is the following: In the mid‑1930s, Stalin decided introduce a new
constitution, which was founded on the restoration of voting rights to those “alien”
and “enemy” elements, and above all the “kulaks,” who had previously had their rights
annulled. Moreover, Stalin planned to introduce free, multicandidate elections. This
would have been a powerful weapon for the struggle with regional party officials, who
had gained too much power. However, these officials, sensing a threat, not only forced
Stalin to scrap his plans for introducing multicandidate elections, but also unleashed a
campaign of mass terror in order to avoid being repressed themselves and to destroy
potential opposition. It was precisely these regional secretaries who forced Stalin to
confirm the decision to undertake the “mass operations,” and who were also partly
responsible for the issuance of order No. 00447.
20 Thus, the leading role of the dictator and the dictatorial system are no longer formally
connected. Of course Stalin—and only Stalin—was capable issuing a directive of such
significance. However, he did not issue this directive alone, but under influence and
stress.  In  general,  despite  the  appearance  of  compromise,  this  version  nonetheless
upholds the fundamental postulates of the original conceptions of “revisionism.” The
Stalinist political system was amorphous and weakly centralized. “The weak dictator”
was not capable of independently making decisions even about such critical questions
as carrying out the “mass operations.”
21 In order to test Getty’s account, several questions must be answered. First, was Stalin
really preparing to introduce democratic elections on the basis of real nominations of
alternative candidates?  Today,  despite  a  long search,  there is  still  not  one piece of
evidence of such an intention. Of course, those members of the population who had
earlier  had  their  voting  rights  annulled  once  again  were  granted  the  right  to
participate in elections in accordance with the new 1936 Constitution. Of course, the
elections  became  direct  and  secret  (voting  by  ballot).  However,  these  were  purely
decorative changes. Based as it was on terror, the political system, which was ruled by a
single party and party apparatus, remained inviolable. The elections of 1937 and of the
years that followed revealed this.
22 However,  let  us  suppose  that  the  secretaries  really  were  afraid  of  multi‑candidate
elections. In that case, it would be important to explain how the “mass operations”
would have helped them avert the threat the elections posed to their authority. This
point is not explained in Getty’s theory.
23 Finally, we must pose the most important question. Does any evidence exist to show
that regional secretaries possessed the power to dictate their terms to Stalin? Neither
Getty nor anyone else has produced such evidence. Through general phrases, without
reference to facts, Getty strives to give in his works the impression that there was a
dialogue of equals between Stalin and the regional secretaries—perhaps even a struggle
for power! He writes about “the struggle between Stalin and an obkom secretary” (66),
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“fight  between the  territorial  committee  chiefs  and  the  centre”  (77).  “The  centre–
periphery struggle for power [sic!] between Stalin and the regional party leaders was a
real contest for power” (83). 
24 In order to lend persuasiveness to these general “strong” theses, the volume includes a
second chapter by Getty about the Yaroslavl secretary Anton Vainov. Relying on the
stenographic records of the plenary sessions of the Yaroslavl oblast party committee,
Getty demonstrates that Vainov was the patron of  a  well‑formed regional  network.
Alone, this observation does not raise any questions. As it has long been well known,
the Soviet political system was to a significant extent dependent upon the development
of  informal  patron‑client  relationships.  Regional  secretaries,  like  the  leaders  in
Moscow,  surrounded  themselves  with  “their  own  people.”  However,  how  does  the
existence of strong patron‑client relations in the regions prove the thesis about the
existence of a secretary with so much political power that he was capable of influencing
Stalin? Getty does not answer that question.
25 As it happens, the example of Vainov provides equal evidence of the absolute weakness
of  the  secretaries  during the  period in  which the  directive  to  carry  out  the  “mass
operations”  was  implemented.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  Vainov,  after  receiving
comparatively mild criticism from Stalin in March 1937, had by May 1937 already been
relieved  of  practically  all  his  responsibilities15.  In  June,  he  was  arrested  and  soon
thereafter shot. This was a very typical fate. By July 1937, when the directive to carry
out the mass repressive operations was implemented, of the fifty‑eight first secretaries
of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  in  the  union republics,  the  krai
committees, and the oblast committees, twenty‑four secretaries were stripped of their
responsibilities (and, as a rule, arrested and then shot): in July – eleven more, and by
the end of the year – almost all of them.16 The arrests of the secretaries set off a chain
reaction of purges among those who surrounded them. Functionaries in the party and
the state apparatus, who, as the text tries to impress upon us, were supposedly the
organizers of the terror, were actually its first victims. Demoralized by fear, they tried
in  every  way  to  curry  favor  with  their  bosses  and  to  save  their  own  lives  by
demonstrating absolute obedience and devotion.
26 However,  let  us  make one  additional  hypothetical  supposition.  Let  us  suppose  that
those secretaries who Stalin did not succeed in destroying before July 1937 really did
possess enough strength to dictate order No. 00447 to Stalin. Do we have enough facts
to support such a supposition? The one fact that Getty produces in defense of his thesis
is  that  the  Politburo’s  decision  about  “mass  operation”  in  Western  Siberia  was
approved on 28 June 1937.  This  decision sanctioned the  execution of  the  leaders  of
“rebellious  organizations,”  who had supposedly  emerged from among the deported
kulaks. A troika was formed for an expedited investigation of the case.17
27 Undoubtedly, the Politburo’s decision had an important effect on the escalation of the
terror.  However,  the  question  remains,  was  that  decision  dictated  to  Stalin  by
Robert Eikhe,  the party leader in Western Siberia?  Getty tries  to  prove that  it  was.
However, the facts suggest the opposite. As Vladimir Khaustov and Lennart Samuelson
demonstrate in their book, the escalation of the terror in Western Siberia, one of the
most important centers for exiled “kulaks,” was related to the work of the NKVD and
the activities of its commissar, Nikolai Ezhov. It was in fact Ezhov who instructed the
head of the directorate of the NKVD for Western Siberia, Sergei Mironov, to deal with
the issue of the large‑scale network of underground resisters. On 2 June 1937, Ezhov’s
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deputy  instructed  Mironov  to  initiate  this  process,  phrasing  it  thus:  “The  People’s
Commissar [Ezhov] attaches great importance to this matter.” In accordance with these
instructions,  Mironov  delivered  fabricated  materials  to  Ezhov.  Ezhov  sent  them  to
Stalin.18
28 In general, as Michael Ellman has noted, “It would be a mistake to consider Mironov’s
report […] as a purely regional initiative.”19 Eikhe’s level of participation in this act is
completely  unknown.  Undoubtedly,  he  listened  to  Mironov’s  presentations  and
supported  his  activities.  At  the  final  stage  of  Eikhe’s  participation  in  these  formal
procedures, as a regional leader, he turned to Moscow with a request to conduct the
operation.20 In fact, the expansion and coordination of the operation in Western Siberia
serves as an example of the model from 1937‑1938. The operations were prepared by
the organs of the NKVD under Ezhov’s leadership, and he was in constant contact with
Stalin. The secretaries supported these actions and the requests of the NKVD, which
they transmitted to Moscow.
29 Having inflated the idea of a “secretaries’ plot,” the “revisionists” ignore the central
role  of  the  NKVD.  Characteristically,  there  is  one  chapter  in  the  volume  at  hand
devoted to  the state  security  organs.  Iain Lauchlan analyzed the sources  about  the
formation of a special caste of chekisty [officers in the security police] in the beginning
of the 1920s. However, it does not help us understand what happened in the NKVD in
the 1930s, especially during the period in which the Great Terror was carried out.
30 The theory of the “secretaries’ plot” has existed for many years, but, in all that time,
those  who  subscribe  to  it  have  been  unable  to  produce  one  substantive  piece  of
evidence  to  support  their  claims.  Conversely,  an  enormous  number  of  facts  and
documents  suggest  that  Stalin,  having  issued  the  directive  to  implement  the  mass
operations,  operated  as  an  independent  force.  All  the  other  Soviet  functionaries,
including the leadership of the NKVD and the regional secretaries,  tried actively to
serve the leader’s positions and the mood of the leader, which were secret to no one.21
 
J. Arch Getty and Iurii Zhukov
31 The obvious weakness of the theory of a “conspiracy of secretaries” limits the number
of  its  adherents  to  such  a  degree  that  Getty,  in  his  contribution,  names  only  two:
himself and the Russian historian Iurii Zhukov. As a doctor of historical sciences and a
fellow at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Zhukov is
known for his plainly pro‑Stalin positions. One of his books is titled The Handbook of a
Stalinist.22 Zhukov makes statements hardly consistent with a scholarly perspective. In
one interview, he explained the cessation of the terror thus: “In the NKVD, majority
was half‑literate Jews in the upper and middle ranks. It was like that in the camps, too.
Almost all of them were removed. Their replacements had either a higher education or
a partial one—having finished three or four years—and were primarily Russians. At that
point  the number of  arrests  began to  fall  sharply.”23 In  addition to  being blatantly
chauvinistic, such declarations simply do not reflect reality. Yet it is just this sort of
mangling of the facts that forms the basis for numerous interviews and speeches by
Zhukov in the mass media.
32 At the beginning of the 2000s, Zhukov became one of the advocates for re–Stalinization
in Russia. Apologists for Stalin, having recovered from the shock of revelations of the
“archival revolution,” went on the offensive. They sought out those ideologues willing
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to say that Stalin’s regime did not commit crimes, and instead was an effective model of
development suited to contemporary Russia. Zhukov filled the niche that had opened
for such an ideologue. As a foundation for his theory, he used Getty’s contention about
the elections and the secretaries.  True, Zhukov rarely cited Getty’s publications.  He
carefully  concealed that  he adhered to the outdated views of  an American scholar.
Obviously, such an “unpatriotic” appropriation might compromise Zhukov in the eyes
of his “patriotic” supporters. 
33 In numerous interviews and in his most well  known book, Zhukov wrote about the
democratic “other” Stalin, who strove to provide the country the best constitution and
defend the people from the tyranny of  the bureaucrats.24 It  was these bureaucrats,
Zhukov wrote,  who were in fact  the true culprits  in the terror.  In general,  Zhukov
“realized” Getty’s contention, augmenting it with the several new attributions similar
in spirit to conspiracy theories. Cleared of accusations that he organized the terror,
Stalin is presented in Zhukov’s works as an honorable leader struggling in the interest
of  the  people  against  the  ill‑intentioned  “oligarchs.”  This  tale  matched  popular
sentiment  among  Russian  citizens  seeking  a  “firm  hand”  capable  of  punishing  the
embezzlers and thieving bureaucrats of the post‑Soviet period to such a degree that
Zhukov’s works were acclaimed as if they had revealed a higher truth.
34 From a scholarly point of view, however, Zhukov’s works do not stand up to even the
most  basic  scrutiny.  In  their  reviews,  professional  historians  noted  that  Zhukov
violated basic norms of scholarly research: He invented facts and events. He distorted
the content of real documents. At the very least, in one extremely important instance,
Zhukov cited a nonexistent document.25 Criticisms of Zhukov were so convincing that
he  never  bothered  to  defend  himself  against  professional  historians,  but  instead
continued to churn out his fantastical stories for unsophisticated and politicized mass
readers.  No  less  tellingly,  Getty  has  not  heeded  Russian  historians’  critical  articles
about the creations of Zhukov either, even though the articles speak directly to the
links between the theories of Getty and Zhukov.
35 Slowly but  surely,  these  efforts  by  historians  in  Russia  have borne some fruit.  The
scholarly reputation of Zhukov and his theories have received sufficient censure, yet
unexpected  support  for  Zhukov  has  now  been  provided  by  Getty.  In  a  review  of
Hagenloh’s  excellent  book  that  is,  in  my  view,  undeservedly  critical,  Getty  wrote,
“Hagenloh seems unfamiliar with the books of Moscow historian Iurii Zhukov on the
domestic  reasons  for  the  decision  to  launch  the  mass  operations.”26 The  advice  to
utilize the arguments of a politicized publicist found guilty of “inaccuracies” appeared
very strange and seemed like an accident.
36 However,  this  citation was  unfortunately  not  an  accident.  Getty  has  actually  taken
Zhukov into his circle of like‑minded thinkers, citing him approvingly in his recent
book.27 Getty also cites Zhukov in a chapter published in the volume in question. Even
more telling is Getty’s citation, on page 225, of a book by Aleksandr Eliseev, a political
activist and publicist of a nationalist bent and the author of pro‑Stalin pamphlets in
which he declares mass terror the country’s salvation. For some reason, Getty refers to
him as a historian.
37 One has  to  wonder  what  Getty’s  real  attitude is  towards  the  works  of  Zhukov and
Eliseev.  In  this  regard it  is  perhaps  telling  that  he  never  makes  use  of  the  “facts”
offered in their publications, but cites only their general reasoning and phraseology,
which in some way support his theory. Whatever one’s view of this particular issue,
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perhaps  the  more  general  question  is  whether  this  sort  of  give‑and‑take  with
unscrupulous and politically motivated journalism is appropriate for a true work of
scholarship.28
 
Motives for Stalin’s Directives
38 If  the  basic  preconditions  of  Stalinist  political  terror  are  evaluated uniformly  by
historians,  then  the  issue  of  the  specific  reasons  for  adopting  the  resolution
authorizing the “mass operations” in 1937 provokes debate. The “traditionalists” offer
a  wide spectrum of  possible  reasons.  They write  of  the adherence of  the country’s
leadership to social engineering, of the danger of incidents during the elections, and of
the destruction of Stalin’s imagined “fifth column” amid the rising threat of war. To
varying degrees, the authors of the Oxford volume underscore the importance of the
moods  and psychological  state  of  Stalin.  Matthew Lenoe calls  attention to  the  fear
provoked in Stalin by the Kirov murder. E.A. Rees “goes so far as to ascribe Stalin’s
behavior to his psychopathic personality.”29 Each of these explanations has its strong
points and weak points, and they should obviously be analyzed as a whole. For example,
the question of setting the internal and external causes of the “mass operations” in
opposition to one another is clearly of a scholastic nature. In reality, the issue is that
Stalin perceived internal threats—the presence of many “enemies”—as more dangerous
in 1937 because of the growing international crisis.30
39 In any event, the principal position of the “traditionalists” is the acknowledgement of
Stalin’s freedom of action regarding the terror, the theory of the “strong dictator.” This
is of the utmost importance.
40 In the framework of the “revisionists”, the question of Stalin’s personal motivations for
initiating the “mass operations” of 1937‑1938 is of secondary significance. Inasmuch as
Stalin acted under pressure from the secretaries, the issue of primary importance is the
motivations of the secretaries themselves. As Getty contends, they were afraid to lose
elections. Of course, they had to make some sort of argument to Stalin, but this aspect
of the matter is poorly articulated by Getty. Theoretically,  we can suppose that the
secretaries frightened Stalin with tales of plotting by numerous “enemies” and hinted
that his “liberalism” was inappropriate.  Zhukov argues that Stalin may have feared
these  political  accusations  of  “liberalism.”  He  was,  after  all,  a  weak  dictator  and
therefore might even lose power.
41 In general, when it comes to the matter of substantive explanations, the “revisionist”
position does not hold water. Getty’s knee‑jerk response is to dismiss out of hand all
renditions  supporting  the  traditional  framework  that  Stalin  possessed  freedom  of
action.  Getty  attacks  the  most  popular  “traditionalist”  explanations  for  Stalin’s
motivations:  the  destruction  of  a  potential  “fifth  column.”  Getty  emphatically
repudiates this possibility. First, he contends, there was no growing threat of war at all
in 1937. Second, he insists that in the documents related to the terror, this motivation
is not discernable. It is not difficult to disprove both of these arguments with numerous
facts.
42 Getty writes, “There were no threatening international events for months before or
after the July 1937 launching of the mass operations.” This is of course a misconception.
It is not difficult for us to establish the synchronization of the terror within the USSR
with growing international tensions. I will note only a few of most well‑known events:
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the “appeasement” of the Nazis by the Western powers and the remilitarization of the
Rhineland in March 1936; the beginning of the war in Spain on 18 July 1936; the passing
of the Politburo resolution of 29 September 1936 on direct intervention in the events in
Spain; the conclusion of the treaty between Italy and Germany on 25 October 1936; and
the  signing  of  the  “Anti–Comintern  Pact”  between  Germany  and  Japan  on
25 November 1936.  The longstanding threat  in  the  Far  East  intensified after  Japan’s
attack on China on 7 July 1937. In the USSR, these events formed the basis for a new
phase of  the elimination of  former oppositionists,  the result  of  which was the first
major Moscow show trial in August 1936. On 29 September 1936, the same day that the
Politburo passed its resolution to intervene in Spain, Ezhov was named the new head of
the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Repression received a renewed impetus.
Stalin was extraordinarily active in following the situation in Spain as it escalated in
1937‑1938. He issued a great many orders to the Soviet representatives in that country.
He concluded that the headquarters of the Republican forces contained many spies and
hidden enemies, and ordered their unmasking and elimination.31 Explaining the key to
the “conspiracy” in the leadership of the Red Army to the members of the War Council
of  the  USSR  People’s  Commissar  of  Defense  on  2 June 1937,  Stalin  declared,  “They
wanted to make a second Spain in the USSR.”32 The expansion of the army and of war
industries began to accelerate in 1936.33 The list of related facts might continue.34 All of
this bears witness to the fact that Stalin considered the world situation threatening.
The very idea of a “fifth column” first appeared during the Spanish Civil,  which he
considered a possible scenario for the USSR.
43 It  is  especially  necessary  to  underscore  that  the  influence  of  external  forces  on
domestic  policy,  and  on  the  policy  of  the  terror  above  all  else,  was  one  of  the
cornerstones of the Soviet system at each stage of its existence. The Bolsheviks came to
power as a consequence of the First World War and always prepared for a new war. The
threat of war and the threat of losing power were for the Bolsheviks interconnected
challenges requiring energetic responses. James Harris reminds us of this again in his
chapter in the volume in question.
44 There is more than a little evidence that the idea of the danger of a “fifth column” was
firmly  lodged  in  Stalin’s  mind  between  1936  and  1938.  Asserting  that  there  is  no
documentary proof for this, Getty ignores “inconvenient” sources and calls attention to
“convenient” documents. He ignores Stalin’s speech to the Central Committee plenum
of February‑March 1937, in which the leader often spoke precisely of the threat of war.
Getty ignores other related documents on Stalin.35 Getty’s main argument is about the
absence of  direct  reference to the external  threat  in order No. 00447.  Furthermore,
Getty does not mention the so‑called “national operations” against Soviet citizens of
German, Polish, and other nationalities.36 In them, the intent to preventatively destroy
supposed  enemy  states’  agents  comes  through  loud  and  clear.  The  chapter  also
withholds evidence when citing some documents.  From Nikolai  Bukharin’s  letter to
Stalin from prison, Getty cites only one part of an important phrase: “Nikolai Bukharin
wrote  in  his  last  letter  to  Stalin  that  a  general  purge  was  in  part  connected  with
‘transition  to  democracy’”  (p. 230).  In  reality,  Bukharin  wrote  that  the  purge  was
carried  out  “a)  in  conjunction  with  the  prewar  phase,  b)  in  conjunction  with  the
transition to democracy.”37
45 In recent years, many archival documents have come to light which reveal how Stalin’s
fears of collaboration between internal and external enemies were understood by the
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direct executors of the terror, the NKVD operatives.38 These documents have also been
ignored by the “revisionists.”
 
The Theory of Popular Initiative
46 Recent trends in historiography have given special attention to social processes during
the period of the Terror. How did people live during the time? What did they think? Did
they take part in the terror or did they try to oppose state violence? Thanks to the
opening of the archives, historians can, with a greater degree of certainty than before,
make judgments about such questions. The contributors to the book in question have
not avoided them. The chapter by Wendy Goldman is dedicated to the factory press, in
which the theme of “enemies” took on a leading role in the years of the terror. The
piece by William Chase is based on materials from party meetings in the apparat of the
Comintern, which was also subjected to intensive purges. Both chapters are further
evidence  that  the  mass  ideological  campaigns  were  important  components  of  the
terror. Their goal was the mobilization of society behind Soviet leaders in the face of
growing threats from enemies.
47 There is no doubt about the importance of studying such campaigns and the methods
of  “brainwashing”  under  the  conditions  of  the  terror.  The  problem  is  in  the
conclusions. Both authors are inclined to see popular initiative as the driving force of
the terror, rather than as a central strategy to mobilize popular support for the terror
campaign.  Goldman  puts  her  argument  this  way,  writing  “Although  central  party
leaders  launched a  series  of  campaigns  that  initiated  terror  on the  local  level,  the
hollowing out of  leadership at  every level—shop, party,  district,  town, and regional
committees—created a chaotic war of each against all.” Chase transplants into Stalinist
soil the results of general research into phenomena such as “scapegoating.” “There is
no question that the scale of repression in the USSR in the 1930s was exceptional, but
the behaviours that contributed to it were sadly universal human behaviours,” writes
Chase  (280).  Noting  the  contributions  of  Goldman  and  Chase,  the  volume’s  editor
concludes, “Without mass participation and support, it is unlikely that the repression
would have spread so rapidly, or claimed so many victims” (239). In this view, citizens
sent more and more denunciations of “enemies,” and the NKVD, in response, carried
out more and more arrests.
48 The  main  weakness  in  the  theory  of  popular  initiative,  as  in  other  “revisionist”
approaches to the study of the Great Terror, is in the weakness of the documentary
evidence, and in the disregard for a whole assemblage of historiography and sources.
Large‑scale  conclusions  are  made  on  the  basis  of  a  small  group  of  very  specific
documents. Chase studies only two events, one of which is related to the campaign of
1934‑35,  following  the  Kirov  murder.  And  the  second at  least  as  easily  contradicts
Chase’s general conclusions. A Comintern employee arrested in 1937, about whose fate
Chase writes, was discussed at a meeting only after the arrest by the NKVD. At the very
least, no “popular action” initiated the destruction of this person.
49 Neither Goldman nor Chase delved into the large literature on the organization of the
terror as a whole or on the lower level. It is as if their case studies hang in the air,
outside  the  contexts  of  events  and of  historiography.  Putting forth their  theory  of
society as the driving force of the terror, they do not explain how the other theories
fail.
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50 In fact,  much recent research allows us to affirm that  denunciations played only a
supporting role in the escalation of the terror. The chekisty possessed an inventory of
“enemies” and “suspicious figures” in their own files,  which had been accumulated
over  several  years.  This  inventory  served  as  the  basic  intelligence  for  the  mass
operations.39 To some degree, in the spread of the terror other methods for exposing
“enemies” were applied. Apart from the lists of names in the NKVD’s own catalogs, the
most common basis for opening new cases was the “evidence” pried from arrestees
with the aid of torture. Any sort of “terrorist” or “espionage” organization could be
quickly constructed from among the acquaintances, friends, relations, and neighbors of
the arrested “enemy.” In addition,  NKVD operatives requested documentation from
various  organs  of  government  (above  all,  the  village  soviets)  on  social  origins,
nationality, and other characteristics. On the basis of such documentation, arrests were
made. Roundups were carried out in villages or on construction sites where former
“kulaks” lived and worked, as well as in marketplaces and the like. People accidentally
caught  up  during  these  roundups  were  tortured  in  questioning  and  forced  to
acknowledge participation in “terrorist organizations.”40
51 Such mass methods of exposing “enemies” had evident advantages for the chekists.
They allowed them to fulfill their growing quotas for arrests quickly. Arriving more or
less spontaneously, denunciations lacked such advantages. As a result, investigations
consisted primarily of confessions received during questioning, as the research shows.
In the archive of the Tomsk oblast directorate of the FSB, denunciations were found in
fewer than 0.5 percent of the studied cases.41 Researchers have established that the
NKVD ignored signals from below, even incriminating materials arriving from party
organs.  NKVD  operatives,  well‑versed  in  fabricating  the  “confessions”  of  those
arrested, stopped working with their agents.42 As researchers have judged, some of the
preserved denunciations were written by “staff witnesses” or agents at the orders of
NKVD personnel, which is to say that they were not actually denunciations in the literal
sense of the word.43 Having started the assembly line of torture, the chekisty were in
possession of a surplus of “candidates” for new arrests and did not need to be helped
out by denouncers.  At the end of  1937,  Ezhov sent an order to the krai  and oblast
directorates of the NKVD to report on conspiracies unmasked with the aid of workers
and  kolkhozniks.  The  results  were  underwhelming.  A  typical  cypher  arrived  on
12 December 1937  from  the  head  of  the  Omsk  NKVD  directorate:  “There  were  no
instances  of  unmasking  of  espionage‑sabotage  Trotskyite‑Bukharinist  or  other
organizations at the initiative of kolkhozniks or workers.”44
52 As  Sheila  Fitzpatrick  long  ago  observed,  in  1937‑1938 the  denunciations  generally
comprised merely one of the sources of “compromising information.” In contrast to
Nazi Germany, they were not the typical starting point for investigations by the Soviet
NKVD.45 Stalinist terror and mass denunciations were connected phenomena, albeit as a
rule, autonomous ones. Activated insofar as the terror grew, denunciations doubtlessly
served as the basis for some number of arrests. Yet the true reasons for the escalation
of “mass operations,” their goals, and their directions were not at all determined by
“popular action.” They depended on the orders of the top leadership of the country and
the actions of  the punitive organs,  who were programmed to fabricate cases  about
mass‑based and far‑flung “counterrevolutionary organizations.”
53 Not all  ideas expressed in previous decades survive the test  of  time.  In the case of
Soviet history, this banal truth is doubly correct. The opening of archives that had been
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completely inaccessible before the beginning of the 1990s fundamentally altered our
conceptions of many events of the Stalin era. Approximately thirty years have passed
since the basic postulates of “revisionism” formed about the essence and mechanisms
of Stalinist terror, including more than twenty years of intensive study of the archives.
This  length of  time is  sufficient  to evaluate the achievements and potential  of  this
tendency.
54 First, it can be noted that contemporary “revisionism” in the study of the Great Terror
has not retreated from its original and fundamental positions. It continues to postulate
the weakness of the Stalinist dictatorship and of Stalin himself as a dictator, as if he
were  subjected  to  significant  influence  from  the  nomenklatura.  It  overstates  the
significance  of  spontaneity  and pressure  from below in  the  terror  of  the  1930s.  In
contrast to these arguments, the “traditionalists” find even more reason to consider
Stalin a “strong dictator.” “Traditionalists” insist on the centralized character of the
“mass operations” of 1937‑1938, and the guiding hand of Stalin in their initiation and
implementation.  Of  course  this  assertion  does  not  mean  that  the  “traditionalists”
ignore  all  of  the  complexities  of  these  tragic  events  or  consider  them  a  colossal
machine,  acting  according  to  a  carefully  designed  plans  without  interruptions  and
speed‑ups:  that  is,  to  use  the  jargon  of  Stalin’s  time,  without  “peregiby.”  For  the
“traditional” approach, only one fact is of primary importance: the power of Stalin was
sufficiently strong to initiate and control the “mass operations,” and at a particular
moment to curtail them in a centralized manner. It is this essential point of fact that
the “revisionists” challenge.
55 Concentrating  on  the  motivations  of  the  terror  of  1937‑1938,  contemporary
“revisionists” give it a universal meaning that it did not, in reality, possess. From this
important  yet  unique  episode  in  Soviet  history, the  “revisionists”  strive  to  draw
conclusions  about  the  system  as  a  whole.  In  practice,  however,  they  do  not  move
beyond the boundaries of 1937. They are not interested in the mechanism for cutting
off the “mass operations” in 1938, to say nothing about other events between the 1930s
and the 1950s. Such a narrow perspective distorts the general outlook of their analysis
of the Stalinist system. Clearly, other phenomena of Soviet history require as much
detailed research as the “mass operations” of 1937‑1938 have received, and should not
be a priori considered with reference to these operations. Putting it another way, in
some events and phenomena we see evidence of an “expansive” dictatorship, but in
others — a “lesser” dictatorship. Yet in 1937 and 1938, the dictatorship was there in
excess.
56 One of the prejudices carefully cultivated by contemporary “revisionists” is that they,
in  contrast  to  the  “traditionalists,”  in  some way are  social  historians  and consider
processes from the bottom up, while the “traditionalists” all reduce everything to the
history  of  Kremlin  offices.  This  argument  a  priori  provides  “revisionists”  with  an
advantage. Clearly and indisputably, the history of the country in the conditions of the
dictatorship was much more complex than the story of the dictator himself.
57 At  the  same time,  in  reality  the  pretensions  of  the  contemporary  “revisionists”  to
possession of a special perspective on Soviet history—“top–down vs. bottom–up,” as the
editor  of  the  volume  writes  in  the  introduction—is  a  clear  misunderstanding  and
distortion of the perspective of their opponents. First, the contemporary “revisionists”
have not  done so  much for  the understanding of  the complicated interconnections
between social  and  political  processes.  Second,  the  proponents  of  the  “traditional”
Top Down vs. Bottom-up: Regarding the Potential of Contemporary “Revisionism”
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/4 | 2015
14
point of view have never considered Stalin alone the cause of the terror. Instead, they
actively study the social history of the terror, and the interactions among the various
structures and levels of the Stalinist system. To be convinced of that, it is necessary
only to read the works on the terror that have been published in the last ten to fifteen
years.
58 The relationship of the contemporary “revisionists” to those facts is entirely selective.
Even after the opening of the archives,  they construct their presuppositions on the
basis of a few carefully selected archival documents. It is this disregard for the whole
body of sources and literature that allows the “revisionists” to maintain the purity of
their framework. The volume at hand clearly demonstrates that tendency. Chapters by
contemporary “revisionists,” tend to cite works primarily within their own circle, or
only select archival sources. If it is advantageous, the “revisionists” are prepared to cite
even the doubtful work of marginal historians or of radical publicists, as in the example
of  Getty,  discussed  above,  in  relation  to  the  books  of  Zhukov  and  Eliseev.  The
“revisionists” note works of opponents only formalistically. Debates on substance are
supplanted by abstract declarations. Contemporary “revisionism” declines to respond
to direct and specific questions that have already been asked by its opponents for many
years.  It  substitutes  phraseology  for  factual  analysis.  In  general,  contemporary
“revisionism” more and more transforms itself into a sort of “historiographic sect,”
only weakly in contact with other researchers.
59 We  cannot  discount  that  the  logic  of  development  of  contemporary  “revisionism”
reflects a general problem confronting current Soviet historiography. The wholesale
opening of the Soviet archives and the precipitous increase of the quantity of research
put historians in a very difficult position. We cannot keep up with all the publications
appearing, and therefore miss many new developments. This tendency increases the
danger of the formation of tight professional groups specializing in narrow themes, the
members of  which are in contact  with one another but  are  not  interested in what
happens beyond the bounds of their group. The great streams of empirical information
allow many authors to publish the same work, for decades at a time, and to ignore
completely  the  critiques  of  their  opponents.  It  seems  that  such  shortcomings  are
becoming more widespread than we would prefer.
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